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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE TOOLS OF LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW: TEACHING
REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER PALAZZOLO

DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH*

INTRODUCTION
Last term the Supreme Court returned to the field of regulatory takings and
bolstered the constitutional rights of property owners whose land is subject to
environmental regulation. It also handed Property teachers a gift. In Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island,1 the Court struck down a state court’s holding that a property
owner who acquired land after the enactment of a land use regulation cannot
claim that the regulation effects an unconstitutional “taking” of his property.
According to the Court, a state may not automatically prevent post-enactment
acquirers of property from pursuing takings claims because they “purchased or
took title with notice of the limitation.”2 The takings clause is more than a
notice provision.3 The temporal relationship between the regulation’s
enactment and an owner’s acquisition of property does not determine whether
he can claim that the regulation deprived him of his property. In other words,
the state is not completely free to alter constitutionally-protected property
rights prospectively. In the circumstances of Palazzolo, the holding is not
controversial.4 The problem is that the Supreme Court previously directed
state courts to define those constitutionally-protected property rights by using
the state’s own “background principles of nuisance and property law,”5 and in
Palazzolo the Court casts doubt on a state’s power to alter those background
principles at all. It is sometimes said that we have a common law

* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1. 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001).
2. Id. at 2462.
3. Id. at 2463 (observing that a majority of the Court in Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), rejected dissenting Justice Brennan’s proposition that those who
purchase land after a regulation’s enactment take title “on notice” of the new regulation’s effect
on their rights).
4. See, e.g., Leading Cases—Takings Clause, 115 HARV. L. REV. 447, 454 (2001). See
also infra note 55.
5. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
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constitution,6 but not since the heyday of Classical Legal Thought a century
ago has it been a doctrinal imperative.7 Which is to say that the common law
of property, as subject matter and method, should enjoy renewed interest
among practitioners, scholars and students.
I. USING REGULATORY TAKINGS TO TEACH THE TOOLS OF THE COMMON LAW
There are three dimensions to a first-year common law course: doctrine,
problem solving and policy analysis. The challenge is to integrate all three.
While most topics in Property provide opportunities to explore each, few do so
more than regulatory takings jurisprudence. Learning the ways that courts
distinguish legitimate exercises of the police power from compensable takings
requires students to master complex doctrine, analyze problems creatively and
grapple with highly-charged policies.
Regulatory takings doctrine begins with the constitutional command that
the government pay just compensation when it takes property for public use8
and consists of the formulas used to determine whether a regulation in which
the government does not physically appropriate the property amounts,
constitutionally, to a taking. Doctrine stemming from the constitutional clause
comes in the form of both hard rules and flexible standards.9 The Supreme
Court has established two per se rules. One is that a permanent physical
“invasion” by the government or its licensee is automatically a taking of
property that demands compensation.10 The other is that a regulation depriving
the owner of all economic benefit, and that is not designed to prohibit a
traditional nuisance, is a taking of property requiring compensation.11 If these
rules do not apply, courts turn to a flexible, multifactor standard that examines
the character of the government regulation, the extent of its economic impact

6. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877 (1996).
7. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 27-31 (1992) (describing the common law boundaries of the
police power in Classical Legal Thought); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF
CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937 (1998).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court incorporated the takings clause against the
states in 1897. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
9. For the distinction between rules and standards, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme
Court, 1991 Term: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); MARK
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING
BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW
AND IN LIFE (1991); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985);
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). See also
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
10. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
11. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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and the average reciprocity of advantage enjoyed by the affected property
holder.12
Doctrine is only the beginning. The novice must also learn how to use
these tools to analyze legal problems and develop persuasive arguments. The
two forms of regulatory takings doctrine—rules and standards—raise
fundamental questions about the nature of legal reasoning and the judicial
function. What are the differences between rules and standards? What are
their advantages and disadvantages? How does each work? A rule is a strict
strategy for enforcing a general principle agreed upon elsewhere. The ideal
rule constrains the decision-maker by forcing her to act automatically if the
predicate facts are present.13 A rule may be over- or under-inclusive, but that
is the price paid for limiting the decision-maker’s discretion to interpret the
principle. Of course, judges exercises some discretion when drawing lines and
defining the key terms of a rule, so that, as Kathleen Sullivan observes, rules
mark the far end of “a continuum, not a divide,” between mechanical and
discretionary judging.14 To mitigate their harsh effects, rules often contain
exceptions.
Standards, on the other hand, require the decision-maker to exercise
discretion. Typically, standards contain factors that guide rather than compel
the judge toward decision. Here, the policy-maker articulates a broad principle
but not the specific rule of enforcement and leaves it to the judge to apply the
principle to individual cases.15 Standards involve judgments of degree rather
than kind, quantity rather than quality, and fact-specific reasoning rather than
mechanical deduction.16 The regulatory taking standard, for example, involves
“essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.”17 Class discussion of the differences
between rules and standards illuminates not only takings law but also basic
styles of legal reasoning that students will use throughout their careers.
Finally, regulatory takings jurisprudence offers an opportunity to explore
policy questions that occupy the contested borderland between law and
politics. Law and politics are two socio-intellectual strategies our society has
developed to facilitate civilized life.18 We rely on both strategies when
addressing divisive issues, and the two intertwine closely in the property
course. Legislation occupies much of our field, and even where it does not,

12. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
13. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 58-60.
14. Id. at 61. See also id. at 61 n. 231.
15. Id. at 58-61.
16. Id.
17. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
18. For a thoughtful analysis of the difference between legal and political modes of thought,
see Frank I. Michelman, Justification (and Justifiability) of Law in a Contradictory World,
NOMOS XXVIII: JUSTIFICATION 71 (J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., 1986).
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judges often revise doctrine in the light of social policy.19 From old limits on
testamentary transfers to new forms of zoning and eminent domain, property
law is where our society works out conflicts between private right and public
will. Property is power,20 which is one thing all students know before they
open their casebooks.
The way property law both facilitates and constrains that power is
something we hope students learn before they sit for the final examination.
They are quick to see that law can serve as an instrument to further private or
public goals but are slower to grasp how legal culture helps define those goals.
Law is means and ends; it contains rules (as well as standards) that we use to
achieve our aspirations, but it also rules us in the sense that it delimits the
realm of the possible in our constitutional culture and helps shape those
aspirations in the first place.21
Regulatory takings jurisprudence offers an excellent example of this
tension between law’s instrumental and constitutive functions. The Supreme
Court is trying to use a state’s own “background principles” of property law to
define the limits of that state’s police power. But traditionally our legal culture
has viewed property law as a state creation. What is the content of a limitation
on state power to regulate property that is defined in terms of the state’s own
property regime? A way to explore this tension is to ask students to play the
role of a judge in an eminent domain case. This allows them to see how the
Court, in cases like Palazzolo, is struggling to halt the vertiginous circularity of
regulatory takings jurisprudence.
II. BACK TO THE FUTURE: URBAN ZONING AND COASTAL WETLANDS
Role-playing is, of course, a venerable teaching strategy. One variation I
find rewarding is to put the students in the position of a real, historical judge
sitting on the bench during another time period. Anachronism reveals
connections between areas of law, such as zoning and environmental land use
regulation, that are separated in our casebooks. The Supreme Court long ago,
under Chief Justice William H. Taft, held zoning to be a valid exercise of the
state police power,22 but in the past fifteen years, under the intellectual

19. For historical examples, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
20. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927).
21. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); Robert
Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of
Aspiration and “The Rights That Belong to Us All,” in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE
353 (David Thelen ed., 1988).
22. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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leadership of Justice Antonin Scalia,23 it has found some environmental land
use regulations to effect takings. After we read the canonical takings cases,
like Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon24 and Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York, 25 as well as the more recent ones involving coastal wetlands
regulation—Nollan v. California Coastal Commision,26 Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council27 and, this year, Palazzolo28—I give my students a
homework assignment: Pretend that Justice Scalia sat on the Supreme Court in
the 1920s and write the opinion that you believe he would have written in the
epochal zoning case Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.29 Would he have voted with
the Supreme Court majority to uphold zoning in 1926, or would he have struck
down zoning as an unconstitutional deprivation of property rights?
The federal trial judge in the Euclid case found that the local zoning
ordinance, which reduced the development value of Ambler’s property by
seventy-five percent, had taken property “without compensation under the
guise of exercising the police power,”30 but the Supreme Court reversed and
upheld zoning as a valid exercise of the police power. Its opinion offers
students a helpful commentary on the distinction between a valid exercise of
the legislature’s police power and a regulatory taking:
The line which . . . separates the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of
power is not capable of precise delimitation. It varies with circumstances and
conditions . . . . [T]he law of nuisances . . . may be consulted, not for the
purpose of controlling, but for the helpful aid of its analogies in the process of
ascertaining the scope of, the power.31

The Court found that much of Euclid’s zoning ordinance fell within the
legislative power to control nuisances, and it upheld the parts that did not, such
as a restriction on apartment buildings, because in some circumstances those
buildings “come very near to being nuisances.”32 The police power extended
beyond the ability to control nuisances; its exercise was legitimate unless

23. Cf. Scott R. Ferguson, Note, The Evolution of the ‘Nuisance’ Exception to the Just
Compensation Clause: From Myth to Reality, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1539, 1543-45 (1994) (arguing
that the germ of the nuisance exception was in Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Penn Central).
24. 260 U.S. 393 (1986).
25. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
26. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
27. Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003.
28. 121 S.Ct. 2448.
29. 272 U.S. 365.
30. Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924). For a
different conclusion from a noted land use planner at the time, see Alfred Bettman,
Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARV. L. REV. 834 (1924).
31. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387
32. Id. at 395.
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“clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”33
Euclid remains the foundational precedent for zoning. Just four years
earlier the Taft Court had struck down another exercise of the state police
power in Pennsylvania Coal, and this remains a foundational precedent as well
for regulatory takings jurisprudence.34 In that case, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr. declared the “general rule . . . that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking”;
the inquiry was “a question of degree.”35 Holmes articulated a standard
containing three factors that a court should consider when judging whether a
land use regulation goes “too far” and “takes” land without just compensation.
The first is the “extent of the diminution.”36 Second, a court should balance
the public interest in the legislation against the damage inflicted on private
property.37 Third, a court should consider whether the regulation benefits the
property owner by giving him some “average reciprocity of advantage” that
helps compensate for the owner’s economic loss.38
The role-playing exercise encourages the students to trace the roots of
zoning and regulatory takings jurisprudence and compare the Court’s approach
to those issues in the 1920s with the approach undertaken during the past
fifteen years. For today’s Court, like the Taft Court, is struggling with a new
form of land use regulation—then it was zoning, now it’s wetlands protection.
The origins of zoning and wetlands protection share similarities. Both
were designed to mitigate the negative effects of industrialization. Federal
incentives furthered each. Vested rights in the form of extant development
were generally protected under the two;39 development expectation values
were not. Zoning emerged over the course of several decades of ferment
around the idea of city planning, but the first modern zoning ordinance was

33. Id.
34. Cf. Gordon Hylton, Prelude to Euclid: The United States Supreme Court and the
Constitutionality of Land Use Regulation 1900-1920, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2000)
(juxtaposing the Euclid and Pennsylvania Coal cases).
35. Id. at 415-16. For an analysis of Holmes’s Pragmatist reasoning in Pennsylvania Coal,
see William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon,
86 GEO. L.J. 813 (1998).
36. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
37. Id. at 413-14.
38. Id. at 415. The Supreme Court reformulated these factors a half-century later in Penn
Central as the character of the government regulation, the degree to which the regulation
“frustrate[s] distinct investment-backed expectations,” and the degree to which the property
owner reaps reciprocal advantage from the regulation. 438 U.S. at 105.
39. Zoning boards often exempted non-conforming uses in existence at the time the
ordinance went into effect; coastal commissions usually let existing structures stand.
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New York City’s in 1916.40 The Commerce Department then drafted a model
Standard Zoning Enabling Act in 1924. Many states soon passed similar
enabling acts and localities followed with a bevy of zoning ordinances.41
The proliferation of wetlands conservation statutes since the 1960s is also
based on a cultural movement that eventuated in a national effort,42 but this
time the federal government is an active partner with the states rather than
merely an instructor. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, for
example, established a federal agency that provides financial and technical aid
to states that institute programs to protect coastal wetlands.43 Typically, a state
establishes a commission to locate wetlands and then limits development on
them.44 But despite similar origins, they have fared differently in the Supreme
Court: zoning is safely within the state police power; wetlands regulation is
not.
From the bench, the students can see that the two phenomena are not
identical. First and most obviously, the exercise reveals the limits of the Lucas
rule. By definition, it only applies when the regulation deprives all economic
benefit. Justice Scalia could distinguish the zoning regulation in the city of
Euclid on its facts because the ordinance deprived Ambler of seventy-five, not
one hundred, percent of its property’s value. How much this should matter is a
question that gets the students thinking about the difference between analyzing
a regulation with a bright line rule and with a flexible standard.
Second, there was more measurable reciprocal advantage for Ambler than
there is for developers restricted by environmental regulation today. While
Ambler could not maximize its land’s development value, it would not be
harmed by commercial development nearby either. Developers like Lucas, on
40. See DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE
AGE 112-208 (1998); THE AMERICAN PLANNER: BIOGRAPHIES AND RECOLLECTIONS (Donald A.
Krueckeberg ed., 2d ed. 1994) (1983); MEL SCOTT, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890
(1971); ROY LUBOVE, THE PROGRESSIVES AND THE SLUMS: TENEMENT HOUSE REFORM IN NEW
YORK CITY, 1870-1917 (1962).
41. Richard H. Chused, Euclid’s Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 598-604
(2001).
42. See Donald Fleming, The Roots of the New Conservation Movement, VI PERSPECTIVES
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 7 (1972); Stacy J. Silveira, Comment, The American Environmental
Movement: Surviving Through Diversity, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 497 (2001).
43. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-65 (2000). See also John R.
Nolon, Land Use Controls that Achieve Smart Growth, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11025 (2001); Mark A.
Chertok, Federal Regulation of Wetlands, SF97 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1149, 1170-71 (2001); John A.
Duff, The Coastal Zone Management Act: Reverse Preemption or Contractual Federalism?, 6
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 109, 109-10 (2001). For federal protection under the Clean Water Act
of wetlands connected to internal navigable waters, see Peter L. Henderer, The Impact of Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Commission: A Practitioner’s Guide to Fifth Amendment Takings of
Wetlands, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 407, 411-12 (1997).
44. For popularity of wetlands statutes and a basic outline of how they work, see The
Coastal Zone Management Program, available at www.ocrm.nos.noaa.gov.
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the other hand, have a harder time realizing reciprocal gain from the
restrictions on their neighbors because the benefits of ecological protection are
more difficult to calculate. Gauging the environmental damage caused by a
specific parcel of land demands a more sensitive notion of causation than our
legal culture possesses.45
Finally, the character of the government action is different. While neither
involves physical appropriation, zoning strikes many as more familiar, in part
because it has in practice been a local endeavor.46 Many Americans believe
that the single-family home represents the natural form of domesticity, despite
the many federal subsidies supporting it.47 Wetlands protection, on the other
hand, is driven by a federal spending program that conditions financial grants
on state regulation of coastal development. The Rehnquist Court has reined in
congressional powers exercised pursuant to Article I, section 8,48 and while it
has not directly limited congressional authority under the spending clause,49
the use of the takings clause here restrains the spending power indirectly. This
is so because the recent decisions privilege private expectations created under
state property law in effect before the state followed the carrot of federal aid
and established wetlands regulations.
I ask my class whether the key difference between South Carolina’s coastal
regulation and Euclid’s zoning ordinance is the extent of the economic
diminution. In other words, if Euclid’s zoning ordinance had denied Ambler
all economic benefit, would Justice Scalia find that the ordinance effected a
taking? He would, unless zoning fell within the nuisance exception to Lucas’s
45. See Joseph Sax, Comment on Harte’s Paper ‘Land Use, Biodiversity, and Ecosystem
Integrity: The Challenge of Preserving Earth’s Life Support System’, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1003,
1004-05 (2001) (observing that “it is very difficult . . . to link the large-caliber problems of
biodiversity loss to the specific developmental acts of individual landowners or to see the usual
cause and effect relationships between an individual construction project and the colossal harm to
the global future”); DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 324-25 (1990). Cf. HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 18-19, 5154, 135-36 (describing the Progressive critique of objective causation).
46. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part One—The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part Two—Localism and
Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990) (exploring the traditional deference to local
government).
47. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 190-218 (1985).
48. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115
HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001); Michael J. Gerhardt, Federal Environmental Regulations in a PostLopez World: Some Questions and Answers, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10980 (2000).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. For a recent analysis of the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in
Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L. J. 1 (2001). See also Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court,
1987 Term—Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent,
102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988).
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bright-line rule. To fit within this exception, a state regulation must, Justice
Scalia wrote in Lucas, “do no more than duplicate the result that could have
been achieved in the courts—by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely
affected persons) under the State’s law of private nuisance, or by the State
under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public
generally, or otherwise.”50 In such cases, “the proscribed use interests were
not part of [the property owner’s] title to begin with.”51
At first glance, the Lucas exception appears circular. The Court defined an
exception to the state’s police power in terms of the state’s own law of
property and nuisance. Ordinarily, we teach first-year students that a
legislature is free to alter the state’s background property regime—some
historical accumulation of common and statutory law—at least prospectively.
But Palazzolo demonstrates that some of the Justices have in mind a
conception of “background principles” that is constitutionally bounded and that
may transcend state lines.52 The declaration of those background principles
remains, however, a matter of state law, so that there are limits to the Supreme
Court’s ability to define state property rights. But the Court is signaling to
state courts that they should interpret state property law more strictly to protect
traditional land rights.
The signals are, however, mixed. While the Palazzolo majority offered
little guidance about how to define those “background principles,” Justice
Scalia advocated a fixed conception and disagreed with the evolutionary
conception of Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Stephen Breyer. Although
Lucas and Palazzolo would not determine the outcome of a latter day Euclid,
most students begin to see that the way Justice Scalia crafted his opinions in
those cases might well influence the application of the ad hoc balancing test
used in most regulatory takings cases.53 His version of the nuisance exception
has the force of a general rule that could be applied to all takings cases, and his
concurrence in Palazzolo further suggests that he is trying to establish a bright
line for distinguishing constitutionally-protected property rights on the one

50. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
51. Id. at 1027.
52. As Frank I. Michelman observed after Lucas, the Court may be reviving the notion of a
general federal common law associated with Swift v. Tyson and repudiated in Erie v. Tompkins.
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and
Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 315 (1993).
53. See Ferguson, supra note 23, at 1558 (predicting that the “common-law background
principles of takings law will figure prominently in the balancing analysis undertaken in the
majority of cases and, perhaps, will lead courts to find that a given regulation that falls short of a
total taking is nonetheless invalid because its goals were not addressed at common law”). See
also Michael A. Wolff, 50 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5, 20 (1996) (noting that the Lucas
nuisance exception “holds a special bond” with other land use decisions “especially as the Court
invokes common-law nuisance principles long eclipsed by modern statutes and regulations”).
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hand and the legitimate objects of the police power on the other.54 Pushed to
its logical extreme, Justice Scalia’s reasoning would greatly limit the state
police power to nuisance control.
III. PALAZZOLO AND THE COMMON LAW “BACKGROUND” OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Palazzolo arose when the Rhode Island Coastal Commission denied
Anthony Palazzolo’s application for a permit to develop his coastal property.
Palazzolo sued the state, claiming under the Lucas rule that the Commission’s
regulations, issued in 1971, denied him all economic benefit of land he
acquired in 1978.55 He pleaded alternatively, under the Penn Central standard,
that the regulations so greatly interfered with his investment-backed
expectations that they effected a taking. The Rhode Island Supreme Court
rejected both claims on the ground that Palazzolo acquired his property after
the enactment of the regulations and therefore took title subject to their
development restrictions.56 The state court reasoned that, while the regulations
might have taken property from whoever owned the parcel at the time they
were enacted, an owner who acquired the land after their enactment could not
pursue a takings claim; the new regulations became part of the title when the
property was transferred.
Justice Anthony Kennedy for a majority of the Supreme Court answered
that
[t]he State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean
bundle . . . . Just as a prospective enactment, such as a new zoning ordinance,
can limit the value of land without effecting a taking because it can be
understood as reasonable by all concerned, other enactments are unreasonable
and do not become less so through the passage of time or title.57

The Court’s holding was narrow: the majority only ruled that the state could
not automatically bar a post-enactment acquirer from challenging a land use

54. Justice Scalia has endorsed a rule-based approach to judging off the bench as well. See
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 9.
55. The chain of title to the parcel at issue in Palazzolo is unusual because Palazzolo
received title to the land when the state revoked the charter of the corporation that owned it, and
of which he was once a part and then the sole owner, for failing to pay income taxes. Palazzolo,
121 S. Ct. at 2456. As a result, this title transfer was not that of a typical purchaser buying land
with full knowledge of the land use regulations affecting the land’s title. Pursuant to the legal
fiction of corporate personality and its dissolution in bankruptcy, Palazzolo was transformed from
shareholder into freeholder. The majority did not emphasize the peculiar circumstances of this
transfer in its reasoning; Justice Breyer, in his dissent, did. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2477 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). See also Brittany Adams, Note, From Lucas to Palazzolo: A Case Study of Title
Limitations, 16 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 225, 261 (2001).
56. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2456-57.
57. Id. at 2462.
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regulation. It also rejected Palazzolo’s Lucas claim,58 but it did not rule on the
merits of the plaintiff’s Penn Central59 claim. That determination will
ultimately depend on the state court’s assessment of the reasonableness of
those expectations, in light of the state’s “background principles.” That
decision will also help reveal the extent to which the nuisance exception to the
Lucas rule is influencing the Penn Central standard.
Before Palazzolo, some commentators believed that “background” had
only a temporal connotation. In an analysis that tracked traditional ideas of
vested rights,60 they believed that while a legislature might not be able to alter
some property rights retroactively, it could change all of them prospectively; a
new regulation that redefined property rights became part of the background
against which takings claims by post-enactment transferees would be judged.61
But in Palazzolo, the Supreme Court held that “background” signifies
something more than the temporal relationship between a regulation and the
acquisition of land subject to that regulation. The majority explained that if
post-enactment acquirers of property could not challenge such regulations, “[a]
State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings
It concluded that “a regulation that otherwise would be
Clause.”62
unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a background
principle of the State’s law by mere virtue of the passage of title.”63
The majority in Palazzolo implied that there are some property rights that
the state may not, or at least not easily, restrict. That is the meaning of the
references to Locke, standing apparently for the proposition that some property
rights are either pre-political or created at a foundational moment of consent,64
and Hobbes, symbolizing the idea of an all powerful sovereign that may

58. Id. at 2457-58 (finding that the parties stipulated that Palazzolo “had $200,000 in
development value remaining on an upland parcel of the property”).
59. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
60. On the nineteenth-century vested rights doctrine, see HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 148-51.
61. See, e.g., Peter L. Henderer, The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and
the Logically Antecedent Question: A Practitioner’s Guide to the Fifth Amendment Takings of
Wetlands, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 407, 421-22, 426-27, 428, 436-37 (1997) (analyzing the effect of the
Lucas exception on Clean Water Act enforcement and concluding that “the post-CWA property
purchaser’s interest in development is not a ‘stick’ in his or her ‘bundle of rights’”); Gregory M.
Stein, Who Gets the Takings Claim? Changes in Land Use Law, Pre-enactment Owners, and
Post-enactment Buyers, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (2000). See also Frank I. Michelman, Property,
Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation”, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1165 (1967).
62. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2463.
63. Id. at 2364.
64. For analysis of this distinction in Locke’s thought, see Peter Laslett, Introduction to
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 15, 113-20 (1960) (1679-83); Melvin Cherno,
Locke on Property: A Reappraisal, 68 ETHICS 51 (1951).
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continually redefine private rights.65 But the Court did not linger in the state of
nature. Quickly it returned to the less imaginary, though ill-defined, realm of
state common law. The majority stated that the background principles of a
state’s law of nuisance and property remain the benchmark for judging even
the prospective effect of new land use regulations, but it rejected the claim that
a state statute automatically becomes part of those background principles for
land transferred after its enactment.66
The question remaining after Palazzolo is whether there is an expiration
date, not on the takings clause, but rather on the reasonableness of a particular
land use. How and when does a land use cross the line between those uses
permitted under a state’s background principles and those impermissible?
Most important, what role does a legislative declaration of unreasonableness
play in this process? The Court’s majority declined to engage these questions,
finding that “[w]e have no occasion to consider the precise circumstances
when a legislative enactment can be deemed a background principle of state
law or whether those circumstances are present here.”67
In their concurrences and dissent, respectively, Justices Scalia, O’Connor,
and Breyer did opine on how a new regulation affects the state’s background
principles of property and nuisance. While some Justices, like former Justice
William Brennan, would classify all new legislative acts as instantly part of the
background principles,68 Justice Scalia classifies none of them as such, unless a
statute merely prohibits a common law nuisance. Eschewing a hard rule,
Justices O’Connor and Breyer are struggling to locate ground in between these
extremes.
For Justice Scalia, the legislative declaration of a land use as unreasonable
is irrelevant to the judicial determination of whether a regulation effects a
taking of that property, retroactively or prospectively.69 He assumes that the
state’s background principles are easily identifiable and unchanging.
Accordingly, the reasonableness of a land use does not change over time,
though the changing circumstances around that land use might transform it into
a nuisance. For a land use regulation to fall within the nuisance exception, the
activity it regulates must have been “always unlawful” and “not part of his
title.”70

65. See JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION 107-10 (1986);
HOWARD WARRENDER, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES: HIS THEORY OF OBLIGATION
325-26 (1957).
66. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2464.
67. Id.
68. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 860 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
69. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2468 (Scalia, J., concurring).
70. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30 (using the example of a nuclear power plant located on a
newly discovered earthquake fault).
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Despite the reference to “always,” Justice Scalia’s nuisance exception does
not require the land use to have been treated as a common law nuisance time
out of mind; his conception of the background principles is historically and
analytically precise.71 The date he chooses for defining the background is
1897,72 when the Supreme Court incorporated the Fifth Amendment’s taking
clause against the States through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment73—the first time the Supreme Court incorporated part of the Bill
of Rights against the States and a measure of the increased solicitude for
property rights at the time.74 There is a curious though perhaps unintentional
realism in choosing 1897 rather than 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment
was enacted, or 1791, when the Fifth Amendment became part of the
Constitution. The benefit for his jurisprudence in looking to the late nineteenth
century instead of the founding era is that many early state constitutions lacked
takings clauses; states that did have takings clauses interpreted them more
narrowly than they would a century later.75 Justice Scalia is aware of these
narrow early interpretations but declares them “irrelevant,” in part because
they preceded 1897 and in part because those state practices “were out of
accord with any plausible interpretation of those provisions.”76 An advantage
of 1897 over 1868 is that the former is approximately when modern zoning
was born and not long before the decisions in Euclid and Pennsylvania Coal.77
The year 1897 also coincides with the high tide of Classical Legal Thought,
which was marked by a new or at least more explicit embrace of natural law
conceptions of property rights and a predilection for categorical restraints on
government power.78 Before 1868, property law was almost entirely state law;
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, or at least the Supreme Court’s
broad interpretation of it a generation later, federalized the boundaries of state

71. See Joseph Sax, Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Property
Rights and the Economy of Nature, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1454 (1993); Joseph Sax, Rights that
“Inhere in the Title Itself”: The Impact of the Lucas Case on Western Water Law, 26 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 943, 945 (1993).
72. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028 n. 15.
73. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
74. HORWITZ, supra note 7.
75. See generally, John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original
Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000); John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use
Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996); William
M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).
76. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n. 15 (1992).
77. Some historians identify the “White City” at the Chicago Columbian Exposition and
World’s Fair of 1893, for example, as “the beginning of modern planning in American.” Donald
A. Krueckenberg, The American Planner: A New Introduction, in THE AMERICAN PLANNER,
supra note 41, 1-14.
78. HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 9-31, 156-59.
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property law. After the New Deal, the Supreme Court largely exited the
business of supervising state property rights. Consequently, the turn of the
nineteenth century may be the best time in which to locate a transcendental
conception of property and nuisance.
Just as important is the negative function of the phrase “background
principles of property and nuisance.” A more contemporary term would be
“regulatory environment,” and it may be to protest this modern idea as much as
to restore the property regime of the 1890s that Justice Scalia’s version of the
Lucas exception operates.79 He has also avoided “common law background,”
perhaps because the prevailing, positivist conception of the common law
Indeed, Justice Scalia’s remedy for
makes this term oxymoronic.80
reductionist positivism—his resort to transcendental principles—is itself a
symptom of it.
In contrast, Justice O’Connor believes that the test for determining whether
a regulation is consistent with a state’s background principles should resemble
a standard. Even when using the Lucas bright line rule she would resort to a
standard to explore whether the regulation falls within the exception.81 In
addition, she thinks that this “temporal relationship between regulatory
enactment and title acquisition” should figure into a court’s calculation of
investment-backed expectations in the Penn Central standard used in most
regulatory takings cases.82 In contrast to Justice Scalia,83 she believes that a
legislative declaration of unreasonableness, while not conclusive, plays a role
in the analysis of whether a landowner had a protected property interest in the
first place. In other words, she does not want the strict Lucas exception to
become identical to the investment-backed expectations factor in the Penn
Central analysis. “[I]t would be just as much error,” Justice O’Connor argued
in her concurrence, “to expunge this consideration [meaning, ‘the effect of
existing regulations’] from the takings inquiry as it would be to accord it
exclusive significance.”84 This “temporal relationship” is an important factor
in calculating the reasonableness of a property owner’s investment-backed
79. Cf. Frank Michleman, The Common Law Baseline and Restitution for the Lost
Commons: A Reply To Professor Epstein, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 69 (1997) (observing that
“[r]egulation stands, in our public law, as an ordinary part of the background of risk and
opportunity against which we all take our chances in our roles as investors in property”).
80. See infra text accompanying notes 91-96. See also Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance
Knot Can’t Undo the Takings Muddle, 28 IND. L. REV. 329, 330 (1995) (arguing that Justice
Scalia’s “recourse to the common law is possible only by a determined evasion of the history of
the common law as it applied to land use”).
81. “The temptation to adopt what amounts to per se rules in either direction must be
resisted.” Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2467 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 2465 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 2477 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
83. The two Justices openly criticized each other’s opinions. Compare id. at 2467 n.*
(O’Connor, J., concurring) with id. at 2467-68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 2465 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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expectations—a factor within a factor—because “the regulatory regime in
place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the
reasonableness of those expectations.”85 In his dissent, Justice Breyer agreed
with Justice O’Connor on this point. He added that, after the enactment of a
regulation, “expectations will diminish in force and significance—rapidly and
dramatically—as property continues to change hands over time.”86
The most interesting possibility under the approach of Justices O’Connor
and Breyer is that a regulation effecting a taking from present holders might
someday be assimilated into the background principles of property law so that
some or all post-enactment acquirers would not succeed with takings claims.
There is, however, no widely accepted theory of constitutional change that
would explain, let alone justify, this inconsistency. Some deny that the
Theories accepting
Constitution should change without amendment.87
informal amendment are divided between those emphasizing “constitutional
moments” and those that trace gradual, evolutionary change.88 They differ not
unlike the way rules and standards differ: constitutional moments are clear and
formal occurrences of which most people are aware; gradual change results
from many factors, and not everyone agrees on how and when it happens.
Evolutionary legal change is more difficult to explain. It involves some
mixture of time, the assimilation of the regulation’s means into our legal
culture, and the regulation’s popular acceptance. In turn, acceptance depends
on a negotiation between the consumers and enforcers of law; here, between

85. Id. at 2466. See also Adams, supra note 56 at 261 (stating that “the most equitable
approach to these fact-sensitive cases is to closely examine the issues surrounding each case”
such as the time the regulation was “in place” before acquisition); Carol Rose, Preservation and
Community: New Directions in the Law of Historical Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1981)
(discussing the community-building function of laws that preserve historical buildings).
86. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2477.
87. Compare Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88
MICH. L. REV. 239 (1989) (concluding that “[t]he framers and ratifiers did not want the
Constitution to change in adaptation to the economic, political, cultural, or moral developments of
American society”), with Kramer, supra note 49 at 16-33 (exploring the customary “popular
constitutionalism” of the founding generation).
88. Compare BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, 2 vols. (1991, 1998), with David A.
Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001) (“The
constitutional principles that actually govern a mature society accumulate and evolve over time
through a variety of complex means”). See also Strauss supra note 6; BARRY CUSHMAN,
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The New Deal Court:
Emergence of a New Reason, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 2014-15 (1990); Eben Moglen, The
Incompleat Burkean: Bruce Ackerman’s Foundation for Constitutional History, 5 YALE J. L. &
HUM. 531, 547-53 (1993) (finding a revival of Burkean custom in recent constitutional theory).
See generally MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, PEACEFUL REVOLUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
AND AMERICAN CULTURE FROM PROGRESSIVISM TO THE NEW DEAL (2000); HERMAN BELZ, A
LIVING CONSTITUTION OR FUNDAMENTAL LAW? AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 245-48 (1998).
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property owners, who calculate whether it is wiser to sue for inverse
condemnation or compromise with local land use officials,89 and the Supreme
Court Justices, whose willingness to entertain such suits changes over time and
with the type of regulation. The open question is whether, and if so to what
extent, the state legislature participates in this process of negotiating the
constitutional meaning of property rights.90
This is why Palazzolo is a wonderful teaching tool. It is a constitutional
case but also raises questions about the nature of the common law. Most of the
Court acknowledges that property rights change over time, but the case
provides no way of understanding when a particular right has changed. The
best term for this process is custom.
The problem is that our post-realist legal culture lacks not just a
convincing theory of evolutionary constitutionalism; it also lacks a
sophisticated way of discussing the irregular changes in any body of law that
Anglo-American legal thinkers used to capture under the rubric of custom.91
The positivist turn in legal theory has collapsed foreground and background,
legislation and common law, the traditions of the interpretive community of
common lawyers and who gets what, when, how.92 Legal realism has come to
stand for the proposition that law is politics. But the slogan has been torn from
its political context as a criticism of Classical Legal Thought and its natural
law conception of property.93 The instrumental conception of the common law
has rendered the idea of custom irrelevant to most modern theories of law.
There remains little sense of how lawyers and judges, for better and ill, have
reshaped that tradition to accommodate and also influence “the felt necessities
of the time”94 We do have theories of norms, and norms may seem like
substitutes for custom. The older idea of custom, however, included room for
change that did not follow academic logic; today’s norms, we are told, hew to

89. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 749 (1986) (discussing the role of “self-management by
orderly and civilized people” in the evolution of property rights).
90. A growing literature is exploring the legislature’s role in defining constitutions. See
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
91. See A.W. B. SIMPSON, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND
LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 359 (1987) (noting the decline of custom in
Anglo-American law); Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality
without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 45-47 (1993) (noting the rise and decline of
evolutionary custom in English law). As Horwitz notes, the immemorial conception of custom
gave way to an evolutionary one in the seventeenth century. Id. See also Rose supra note 91
(discussing custom in property law).
92. See HAROLD D. LASWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW (1936). For an
observation similar to mine but containing a different prescription, see ALAN BRUDNER, THE
UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW: STUDIES IN HEGELIAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995).
93. This interpretation of legal realism relies on HORWITZ supra note 19.
94. See Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
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the laws of efficiency.95 The closest we come to exploring custom in this
traditional sense of a gradually changing corpus is in first-year courses like
Property that analyze recalcitrant common law rules, how they change over
time and the forces that guide that change.96 Outside those courses, custom
makes few appearances.
The Supreme Court may bring it back to the mainstream. It is trying to
distinguish legislation and principle, foreground and background, anew.
Justice Scalia does so by embracing hard rules and static background
principles. Justices O’Connor and Breyer, on the other hand, are groping
toward a customary conception of property rights. Historically in AngloAmerican legal culture, custom was a concept that functioned to allow legal
professionals to negotiate incremental change while maintaining, as a matter of
ideology, that the common law remained substantially the same from
generation to generation. It was method more than substance.97 As Sir
Matthew Hale wrote in the late seventeenth century, law responds to “the
Conditions, Exigencies and Conveniences of the People,” so that over time
“there grows insensibly a Variation of Laws.” When and how those exigencies
altered the common law was, Hale thought, difficult to trace; statutes played a
role along with “Judicial Resolutions.” Nonetheless,
tho’ those particular Variations and Accessions have happened in the Laws, yet
they being only partial and successive, we may with just Reason say, They are
the same English Laws now, that they were 600 Years since in the general. As
the Argonauts Ship was the same when it returned home, as it was when it
went out, tho’ in that long Voyage it had successive Amendments, and scarce
came back with any of its former Materials.98

This is a vision of legal change more radical than the “changed circumstances”
conception Justice Scalia endorses.99 A brief survey of American land use
regulation suggests that it remains relevant to the question of whether wetlands
regulations reflect a fair evolution of customary property rights.100
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE TRADITION OF MORAL TOPOGRAPHY
Do environmental land use regulations offend the background principles of
American property law? John F. Hart’s examination of early American land
95. See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991). See also Richard Epstein, The Path to the T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History of
Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 3 (1992).
96. See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781 (1989);
See also MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 154-61 (1988).
97. See Simpson supra note 93 at 376.
98. MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 40 (Charles Gray
ed., 1971).
99. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1003 (1992).
100. For a different approach to a similar question see Rose, supra note 91.
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use regulation101 demonstrates that there is a long tradition of land use
legislation based on what might be called moral topography: the belief that
forms of land use have moral consequences.102 For example, after the
American Revolution the new states regulated the physical use of space to
create a civic republican environment.103 The private was public in the sense
that early Americans believed that the visual experience of a neighborhood
inculcated values that in turn shaped human behavior. The built environment
was didactic; it was designed, literally, to educate citizens.104
The specific conception of the best way to shape the land has changed over
time and at most times is contested. In broad outline, the neoclassicism that
was the aesthetic expression of republican ideology—the grid, clean lines,
spare facades, monumental public buildings and a wariness toward untamed
nature105—gave way in the nineteenth century to a romantic conception
emphasizing organic shapes, fanciful design and a pastoral vision of nature.106
Its legal manifestation took the form of, for example, public parks and
cemetery laws.107
Progressives at the end of the nineteenth century returned focus to the
urban environment. More light and air circulation would, they thought, reduce
disease; healthy citizens would avoid vice and become productive members of
society.108 Recent ecological regulation is also premised on a belief that how
Americans use their physical environment reflects and shapes who they are as
a people. While these land use regulations often retard economic development,

101. See Hart, supra note 76, at 1007.
102. Cf. Chused, supra note 42 at 601 (quoting PAUL BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL
ORDER, 1820-1920 (1978) (arguing that the “‘positive environmentalism’” of the Progressive era
represented a break from earlier planning theories). See also Martha A. Lees, Preserving
Property Values? Preserving Proper Homes? Preserving Privilege?: The Pre-Euclid Debate over
Zoning for Exclusively Private Residential Areas, 1916-1926, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 367, 370
(arguing that proponents of zoning sought to “actualize” the ideologies of domesticity and
pastoralism).
103. See HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1860 (1983).
104. See J. B. Jackson, The Order of a Landscape: Reason and Religion in Newtonian
America, INTERPRETATION OF ORDINARY LANDSCAPES: GEOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS, 153-63 (D. W.
Meinig, ed., 1979); JOHN R. STILGOE, COMMON LANDSCAPE OF AMERICA, 1580-1845 87-134
(1982). On the didactic strand of the American Enlightenment, see generally HENRY MAY, THE
ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1976).
105. See JOHN D. SEELYE, BEAUTIFUL MACHINE: RIVERS AND THE REPUBLICAN PLAN,
1755-1825 (1991).
106. See THOMAS BENDER, TOWARD AN URBAN VISION: IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1975).
107. See, e.g., THE PARK AND THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF CENTRAL PARK (Elizabeth
Blackmar and Roy Rosenzweig eds., 1992).
108. See LUBOVE supra note 41; Chused, supra note 42.
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they are also leavened with human-centered utilitarianism, with calls for
sustainable or “smart growth.”109
The point for instructional purposes is that there has been a long tradition
of legislative shaping of our physical environment that includes but is not
limited to zoning. The tradition has persisted, although its constitutive
materials have changed radically. Courts have shown great deference to this
tradition except when it has been used explicitly to exclude people on the basis
of race or ethnicity.110 Early Americans did not recognize these regulations as
taking property because not all expectation interests were recognized as legal
interests until the Supreme Court, in a series of late nineteenth-century rate
regulation cases, constitutionalized the protection of what we now call
investment-backed expectations.111 Put simply, the bag of early modern writs
did not include one for suing government officials for reducing the
development potential of land caused by the legislative pursuit of moral
topography. We tend to think of the “bundle of sticks” metaphor as reflecting
a modern conception of property, but in the early modern period property
really was a bundle of interests rather than a coherent thing. It was a bundle of
rights because Anglo-American legal culture had developed a bundle of
common law writs to vindicate those rights; institutionally at least, writ
preceded right.112 The state’s denial of one of those recognized interests,
whether directly through physical appropriation or indirectly through
regulation, amounted to a taking. If there was no recognized interest, there
was no taking.
Today, investment-backed expectations are factored into the scrutiny of
regulations that may go “too far.” A conventional, or customary, conception of
expectation interests would preserve room for change and ensure that such
interests do not rigidify into unchangeable, static rights.113 That process—the

109. See, e.g., James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Smart Growth and Limits on
Government Powers: Effecting Nature, Markets and the Quality of Life under the Takings and
Other Provisions, 9 DICKINSON J. ENVT’L. L. & POL. 421 (2001).
110. See Joel Kosman, Toward an Inclusionary Jurisprudence: A Reconceptualization of
Zoning, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 59 (1994).
111. See HORWITZ supra note 7 at 148-51, 160-64, 194-98. See also Stephen A. Siegel,
Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate
Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187 (1984).
112. See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Writs to Rights: “Navigability” and the Transformation of the
Common Law in the Nineteenth Century, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049 (2002); Carol M. Rose,
Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L. J. 601 (1998); Robert W.
Gordon, Paradoxical Property, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 95 (John Brewer
& Susan Staves eds., 1995).
113. An approach to gauging expectations is used in contract clause cases. When a private
party claims that a new, retroactive state law has impaired contractual obligations, the Court
surveys the regulatory environment at the time the contract was made to gauge whether that party
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abstraction of rights—has helped destroy theories of custom.114 If Justice
Scalia’s version of investment-backed expectations succeeds, a dynamic sense
of expectations interests will fade too.
V. CONCLUSION
A century and more of positivist legal theory has, as it were, accustomed
us to viewing legal principles as social constructions; while they do change
over time, it remains difficult and controversial to take a free hand in the
building. Perhaps this is what the Supreme Court is trying to say in its
regulatory takings jurisprudence. Understood functionally, when the Court
holds that a regulation effects a taking, it is signaling that the legislature has
tried to accelerate change faster than the Justices believe fair or wise.115
“Taking” symbolizes the belief that the means of the law are endangering its
ends, that the tools of the law threaten the rule of law. This judgment too is “a
question of degree”116—a matter of convention—and no doctrine will ever
make it mechanical.117 Students sense the difficulty when asked to apply
modern takings doctrine to old zoning cases. Someday, before the bar and on
the bench, they will participate in that judgment. It is not yet clear whether
they will continue to do so as voters and legislators.

should reasonably have expected the new regulation. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
114. Cf. Thomas Haskell, The Curious Persistence of Rights Talk in the “Age of
Interpretation,” 74 J. AM. HIST. 984 (1987).
115. See Michelman, supra note 53; See also Rose, supra note 91 at 761-74.
116. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1986).
117. In a case decided as this Essay went to press, a six-member majority of the Supreme
Court embraced Justice O’Connor’s flexible approach to takings jurisprudence and refused to
create a per se rule that would recognize a new category of total but temporary takings. See
Tahoe-Sierra, Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, No. 00-1167, 2002 U.S.
LEXIS 3028 (Apr. 23, 2002).

